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WRITIEN AND UNWRITIEN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
FOUNDING PERIOD: THE EARLY 
NEW JERSEY CASES 
Wayne D. Moore • 
Holmes v. Walton, a case decided by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court on September 7, 1780, has been at the center of controversies 
over the legitimacy of judicial review under the federal Constitu-
tion. I Holmes is the earliest known example of judicial review in 
the American colonies.2 A companion case, Taylor v. Reading,J 
decided eight years after the Constitution's adoption, offers similar 
insights into relationships between legislative and judicial interpre-
tations at the time. 4 
Holmes is historically significant not only because the judges 
exercised a form of judicial review, but also because they went be-
yond the text of the New Jersey Constitution.~ The judges relied on 
• J.D., 1983, University of Virginia School of Law; Ph.D. candidate, Princeton Uni-
versity (Politics). Copyright© 1990 by Wayne D. Moore. I am indebted to Walter F. Mur-
phy, of Princeton University, and to William F. Harris, II, of the University of Pennsylvania, 
for comments on the manuscript. I am also indebted to Bette M. Barker for assistance in 
locating records at the New Jersey State Archives. I dedicate this article to my grandfather, 
Harry E. Dietrich. 
I. See Scott, Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 AM. HISTL. REv. 456 
(1899); Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REv. 102-25, 283-316 
(1910); Boudin, Precedents/or the Judicial Power: Holmes 11. Walton and Brattle v. Hinckley, 
3 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 173 (1929); I L. BouDIN, GovERNMENT BY JuDICIARY, 531 app. 
(1932) [references herein to Boudin's arguments are to this work]; 2 W. CROSSKEY, PoLmcs 
AND THE CoNSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 948-52 (1953); L. LEVY, 
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CoNSTITUTION 89-99 (1988). 
2. Other precedents for judicial review in the colonies have been identified, but none 
antedating Holmes. See, e.g., Corwin, supra note I, at 110-17; I B. ScHWARTZ, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: A DocUMENTARY HISTORY 383-431 (1971). 
3. As with Holmes, a written opinion for Taylor has not been located. Both cases are 
described as precedents for judicial review in an opinion for a later case, State v. Parkhurst, 9 
N.J.L. 427, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1802) (Volume 9 of New Jersey Law Reports contains reports of 
cases from 1827 to 1828, as well as the appendix reporting Parkhurst.) 
4. See generally W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W.HARRIS, II, AMERICAN CoNSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION 181-284 (1986), on issues of interpretive authority. See a/so Mur-
phy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 THE 
REV. OF POL. 401 (1986). 
5. See generally W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 77-180, on 
the issue of what the Constitution is (including what it includes). 
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the New Jersey Constitution's written guarantee of jury trials,6 but 
they were also willing to enforce norms not explicit in the constitu-
tional text. 7 The early years of the Republic saw the emergence of 
both textual and non-textual judicial review.s It is remarkable that 
what seems to have been the first American documented case of 
judicial enforcement of a written constitution centered on an issue 
not addressed explicitly in the text of that constitution. 
Constitutional theory in this century has been preoccupied 
with the legitimacy of judicial review. The early New Jersey prece-
dents examined in this article link that issue to broader questions of 
constitutional meaning. In studying America's fundamental law, it 
is necessary to look beyond the texts themselves to political prac-
tices and other sources of law that infuse the texts with their mean-
ings in ways that constrain political activity. 
I 
There is substantial controversy over whether the judges in 
Holmes actually exercised judicial review. An opinion by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has never been located, permitting Louis 
Boudin and William Crosskey to argue that the decision turned on 
a question of statutory interpretation.9 Considerable evidence, how-
ever, supports Austin Scott's conclusion that the judges invalidated 
legislation based on issues of constitutional interpretation.1o A case 
file at the New Jersey State Archives contains reliable evidence of 
what issues were presented to the judges;u supreme court minutes 
report reversal of an earlier judgment; 12 a petition presented to the 
6. See Corwin, supra note l, at 110-12. 
7. See Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1141 
(1987). 
8. See Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American 
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 893 (1978) (stating that the efl'ect of the "new 
practice" of writing constitutions on "the idea that judicially ascertainable fundamental law 
could itself have constitutional status remains to be carefully analyzed"). 
9. See L. BoUDIN, supra note 1, at 537-52; W. CROSSKEY, supra note l, at 948-52; see 
also L. LEVY, supra note l, at 93. 
10. See Scott, supra note 1, at 460, 468-69. 
11. The principal case file is at the New Jersey State Archives ("N.J. Archives"), which 
is associated with the New Jersey State Library in Trenton, filed in the "Judicial Records" 
record group, "Supreme Court" subgroup, "Actions at Law" series, containing cases before 
and after the Revolution, in Envelope No. 44928 (containing materials primarily relating to 
subsequent proceedings in the case). In addition, Envelope No. 18354 contains two petitions 
that argue for reversal of a verdict against John Holmes and Solomon Ketcham. Section II of 
this article centers on the theoretical premises reflected by these petitions. 
Unless otherwise cited, references herein to envelope numbers at the N.J. Archives are to 
the record group, subgroup and series cited in this note. 
12. Minutes of the New Jersey Supreme Court, April 1775-1782, at 343 (September 7, 
1780). See Scott, supra note 1, at 459. 
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New Jersey legislature two months after the decision complained of 
the court's "set[ting] aside some of the laws as unconstitutional;"tJ 
contemporary observers apparently viewed the decision as based on 
constitutional grounds; t4 a reported opinion for State v. Parkhurst 
states that in Holmes an act that had been challenged as unconstitu-
tional "upon solemn argument was adjudged to be unconstitutional 
and in that case inoperative;"ts and a series of statutes subsequently 
enacted by the New Jersey legislature support Parkhurst's state-
ment that the decision in Holmes was "recognized and acquiesced 
in by the legislative body of the state."t6 Nevertheless, Boudin and 
Crosskey's arguments for a di1ferent interpretation of these histori-
cal materials deserve serious scrutiny. 
A. ACCOUNTING FOR JUDICIAL SILENCE 
Boudin relied heavily on the absence of an opinion in Holmes 
in arguing that the case was not decided on constitutional grounds. 
He assumed that no court would have declared an act of legislation 
unconstitutional without writing an opinion. Because "a lot of un-
important trash" relating to the case had been preserved, he as-
serted that "no opinion of this kind, if written, could have been 
lost." He concluded that the decision "was not considered impor-
tant enough for any opinion to be written."t7 
Boudin relied on similar presuppositions in attempting to im-
peach the credibility of Parkhurst's account of Taylor v. Reading, 
another case reported by Parkhurst as a precedent for judicial re-
view within New Jersey. According to Parkhurst, "in the case of 
Taylor v. Reading, a certain act of the legislature ... was by this 
court held to be an ex post facto law, and as such unconstitutional, 
and in that case inoperative."ts Boudin asserted that Taylor would 
have been "a great case" of "tremendous importance" if this ac-
count were correct. Because "no such case is reported in the vari-
ous collections of reports, and no searchers after precedents have 
13. 1780 Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey 52 
(December 8, 1780). See Scott, supra note I, at 459-60. 
14. For example, Gouverneur Morris apparently was referring to Holmes in his "Ad-
dress on the Bank of North America," presented to the Pennsylvania Assembly (1785), re-
printed in 3 J. SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GoUVERNEUR MORRIS 437, 438 (1832). See also Scott, 
supra note I, at 460-65. Compare Corwin, supra note I, at 111-12; W. CRossKEY, supra note 
I, at 951. 
15. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. at 444. 
16. /d. See also the series of laws catalogued at P. WILSON, ACTS OF THE CoUNCIL 
AND GENERAL AssEMBLY OF NEW-JERSEY app. (1784) (the volume covers laws enacted 
between 1776 and 1783) [hereinafter cited as WILSON's LAws). Compare Scott, supra note I, 
at 463; L. BoUDIN, supra note I, at 545-52. See also note 55, infra. 
17. L. BouDIN, supra note I, at 545. 
18. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. at 444. 
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ever been able to discover any record of such a case," the author of 
Parkhurst must have taken "some vague rumor for an authenticated 
fact."t9 Boudin concluded that Parkhurst was similarly "worthless 
as evidence" of what happened in Holmes.2o 
Boudin was incorrect in assuming that there would be written 
opinions for Holmes and Taylor if the New Jersey Supreme Court 
had declared legislation unconstitutional in these cases. Court 
records at the New Jersey State Archives completely corroborate 
Parkhurst's account of Taylor.21 Among other things, these materi-
als explain that a written opinion was unnecessary in Taylor pre-
cisely because the judges exercised a form of judicial review. 
Boudin and other "searchers after precedent" apparently were 
unable to locate court records relating to Taylor because the case's 
original name was Cadwallader v. Reading, not Taylor v. Reading. 
The dispute concerned bonds originally acquired by Lambert Cad-
wallader from Joseph Reading. Cadwallader assigned these bonds 
to Joseph Taylor,22 who thereafter sued Reading. Although Cad-
wallader was the nominal plaintiff because the bonds were in his 
name, the case became known by the real parties in interest: Taylor 
and Reading.23 
A hand-written petition dated November 11, 1795, submitted 
by Joseph Reading to the New Jersey legislature, includes a detailed 
account of the case. As described by Reading's petition, the New 
Jersey legislature adopted a law on November 28, 1789 for the pur-
pose of "authorizing persons whose Estates had been confiscated, to 
demand and receive the Debts, due to the State of New Jersey."24 
Before the Revolutionary War, Reading had borrowed £300 from 
Lambert Cadwallader and "paid over the whole Amount" to a rela-
19. L. BoUDIN, supra note l, at 542. 
20. /d. 
21. Again, the principal case file is at the New Jersey State Archives ("N.J. Archives"), 
in the "Judicial Records" record group, "Supreme Court" subgroup, "Actions at Law" se-
ries. Envelope No. 8288 is identified by the case's name, "Lambert Cadwallader vs. Joseph 
Reading." In addition, a handwritten petition from Joseph Reading to the New Jersey legis-
lature describes the proceedings in the case through and including the supreme court's invali-
dation of a law enacted by the legislature on November 28, 1789. The "Petition of Joseph 
Reading to the Honorable The Legislative Council and General Assembly of the State of New 
Jersey," dated November 17, 1795, is located at the N.J. Archives, in the "Bureau of 
Archives & History" record group, "Manuscript Collection" subgroup, "Manuscripts" se-
ries, Box 42, Folder No. 23. The petition is hereafter cited as the "1795 Petition." These 
materials, along with others that corroborate them, are discussed below. 
22. I discuss below a series of transactions relating to the bonds. 
23. See N.J. Archives, Envelope No. 8288; 1795 Petition. 
24. Compare "An Act to Authorize Persons whose Estates have been Confiscated, or 
their Legal Representatives to Demand and Receive all Debts or Sums of Money which are 
Due to this State in Virtue of such Confiscations," 1789 Acts of the General Assembly of the 
State of New Jersey [hereinafter cited as N.J. Session Laws] 545-48 (November 28, 1789). 
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tive whose other obligations Reading had guaranteed. Even follow-
ing the relative's default to him, Reading had annually paid interest 
on the bonds to Cadwallader or Taylor, until the latter "sometime 
in 1776 took refuge with and Joined the Armies of the King of 
Great Britain ... and took the said Bonds with him into the lines of 
the Enemy." After Taylor's estate had been forfeited to the state 
pursuant to a war-time seizure law,2s Reading paid £352 to the 
Commissioner of forfeited Estates of Hunterdon County, in full sat-
isfaction of "the Monies due at the time. "26 Reading had not been 
"apprized that any deficiency did exist until a suit was brought 
against him in The Supreme Court of New Jersey" under the law of 
November 28, 1789. (The 1789 law provided for the collection of 
debts by persons whose estates had been forfeited during the war.)27 
Court records confirm that Taylor had prevailed against Reading in 
this suit: An order by Chief Justice Kinsey, dated the second Tues-
day in May 1794, commanded the sheriff to seize property belong-
ing to Joseph Reading in satisfaction of a judgment in Lambert 
Cadwallader's favor.2s 
On March 13, 1795, apparently in response to Justice Kinsey's 
order authorizing the seizure of Reading's property,29 the New 
Jersey legislature adopted a statute entitled "An act for Relief of 
25. According to Reading's petition, he was "desirous of complying with the Laws 
which were then thought necessary for the safety and welfare of [his Country] and in pursu-
ance of the Act passed the 18th of April, 1778 for the purpose of forfeiting the personal 
Estates of certain Fugitives and Offenders, an Inquisition having been duly formed against 
the said Joseph Taylor and final Judgment entered thereon, Your Petitioner did take Meas-
ures to raise the Money so due and forfeited to the State of New Jersey." Compare "An ACT 
for taking Charge of and leasing the Real Estates, and for forfeiting the Personal Estates of 
certain Fugitives and Offenders, and for enlarging and continuing the Powers of Commission-
ers appointed to seize and dispose of such Personal Estates, and for ascertaining and dis-
charging the lawful Debts and Claims thereon," April 18, 1778, reprinted in WILSON'S 
LAWS, supra note 16, at 43-52. 
26. According to the petition, "the said Joseph Taylor [was] still holding the said Bonds 
in his Person [behind the lines of the Enemy)" when Reading paid the £352. As further 
evidence of his good faith, Reading stated that he had not thought it necessary to avail him-
self of a law passed November 29, 1788 which provided relief to persons concealing debts. 
Compare "An ACT for the Relief of Persons liable to Fines, for concealing Debts and other 
property forfeited to this State," 1778 N.J. Session Laws 499 (November 29, 1788). 
27. See note 24, supra. 
28. N.J. Archives, 143 SUPREME CoURT JUDGMENTS 344-45 (1794). Compare Park-
hurst's statement that Holmes and Taylor were "determined upon full consideration, the for-
mer in the time of CHIEF JUSTICE BREARLEY and the latter in the time of CHIEF 
JUSTICE KINSEY." 9 N.J.L. at 444. 
29. The supreme court presumably had held that Reading's payments during the war 
did not reduce his liabilities pursuant to the forfeited bonds. Having lost before the supreme 
court, Reading apparently petitioned the New Jersey legislature to provide relief from Kin-
sey's verdict, based on arguments similar to those made in his petition of November 11, 1795. 
The legislature had responded by adopting the law described in the text accompanying this 
note. 
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certain Persons, having paid Monies to the Commissioners and 
Agents of Forfeited Estates."JO The statute's syllabus summarizes 
its subject-matter: "In what cases continental money shall be 
credited as specie. "31 This is precisely the language used in Park-
hurst to identify the law invalidated in Taylor.32 The act itself read: 
BE IT ENACTED ... That all payments made to commissioners or agents of 
forfeited estates in continental, or other currency receivable by such commissioners 
or agents while the same was a legal tender, by any debtor, in virtue of the act or 
acts for confiscating the estates of certain fugitives and offenders, shall be taken and 
allowed by all courts and juries in this state, in favor of such debtor or debtors, to 
the full nominal value ofthe said payments respectively, notwithstanding it should 
appear that the whole debt and interest due from such debtor or debtors was not 
thereby discharged.33 
According to Reading's petition, he "viewed with much Satisfac-
tion" the New Jersey legislature's adoption of this law. He "well 
hoped that as the Suit was then pending against him that he should 
be entitled to the provisions therein contained." The supreme 
court, however, struck down the statute: 
But to the great surprize of your Petitioner the said Act of the legislature was con-
sidered as ex post facto and declared void, and that the same ought not to bind the 
Said Court in giving their Judgement upon the suit against your Petitioner .... 34 
Reading's petition indicates that the court was concerned pri-
marily with judicial prerogatives and the law's effect on its judg-
ment.3s Kinsey's order of May 1794 represented the supreme 
court's determination of what the applicable law required in the 
context of Taylor's suit against Reading. The judges adhered to 
their initial determination even after the New Jersey legislature 
passed the law in March of the next year to relieve Reading's liabili-
30. 1795 N.J. Session Laws 1032 (March 13, 1795) [hereinafter cited as the "Act of 
March 13, 1795"]. 
31. See id. 
32. Compare Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. at 444 ("a certain act of the legislature ... declar[ed) 
that in certain cases payments made in continental money should be credited as specie .... "). 
33. Act of March 13, 1795. The 1795 Petition identifies the law by the date of its 
adoption and describes it as follows: "the Act passed the 13th of March last wherein it is 
enacted that all payments made to Commissioners or Agents of forfeited Estates in Continen-
tal Currency shall be taken and Allowed, by all Courts and Juries in favor of the Debtor to 
the full Nominal Value of said Payment, notwithstanding the whole debt and Interest was not 
discharged." 
34. 1795 Petition. 
35. In the absence of a written opinion, we cannot be certain of the extent to which 
Reading's petition summarizes the court's position as distinct from the views of Reading or 
his attorney. (Reading's petition was addressed to legislators, suggesting how they might 
respond to the decision.) Supporting the petition's characterization, the later Gudicial) opin-
ion for Parkhurst stated that in Taylor the court had held the 1795 law "unconstitutional, and 
in that case inoperative." Thus, Reading's petition and Parkhurst each indicate that the court 
in Taylor was concerned primarily with the judicial enforceability of legislative enactments 
rather than with the scope of legislative powers more generally. 
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ties. By declaring the 1795 act void as ex post facto, the judges im-
plicitly reaffirmed their prior order. Boudin was therefore wrong in 
claiming that there would have been an opinion if the judges had 
exercised judicial review. On the contrary, their exercise of judicial 
review made amending the earlier judicial record in the case 
unnecessary. 
These considerations also suggest why Taylor was not viewed 
as a case of "tremendous importance" at the time. The statute ap-
parently had been designed specifically to alleviate Reading's liabili-
ties to Taylor, and had little broader impact. The court's decision 
did not settle the controversy between Reading and Taylor, because 
the former eventually obtained similar relief through other means. 
His ability to do so indicates that the decision did not fundamen-
tally challenge the legislature's lawmaking authority.36 
On January 31, 1797, the New Jersey legislature again granted 
Reading's request for relief from his liabilities to Taylor.37 This 
time, the legislature adopted a law tailored specifically to Reading's 
predicament: The law was titled "An Act for the Relief of Joseph 
Reading."Js It made reduction of Reading's liabilities to Taylor 
contingent on the latter's producing a certificate that "exonerated 
and discharged" Reading from one-third of the judgment recovered 
by Taylor against Reading.39 The legislature in essence utilized dif-
ferent legal formalities to achieve the same result as that contem-
36. Taylor was of "tremendous importance," however, in terms of the interpretive prin-
ciple underlying the court's refusal to revise its verdict against Reading. The thrust of the 
decision was to protect judicial prerogatives rather than to challenge legislative powers. The 
1795 Act, which provided for a reduction of Reading's liabilities, would have effectively re-
versed Kinsey's verdict of May 1794 in Taylor's favor. The law therefore challenged the 
court's authority to interpret the Act of November 28, 1789 independently of the legislature. 
By invalidating the 1795 Act, the court asserted its prerogative to decide cases and controver-
sies in a final manner. 
37. In addition to the 1795 Petition, see also a subsequent "Petition of Joseph Reading 
to the Honorable, the Legislative Council and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey" 
dated November II, 1796, at the N.J. Archives, Box 42, in Folder 24 of the "Manuscripts" 
series cited in note 21, supra. The later petition refers to a committee report recommending 
legislation favorable to Reading, thus anticipating adoption of the January 1797 law dis-
cussed below. 
38. 1797 N.J. Session Laws 144 (January 31, 1797). 
39. Section I of the act provided: "BE IT ENACTED by the Council and General 
Assembly of this State, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the Same, That Joseph 
Taylor, his heirs, executors and administrators, be, and they are hereby exonerated from the 
payment of the one third part of the judgment recovered by the said Joseph Taylor against 
Joseph Reading, of the county of Hunterdon, at the suit of Lambert Cadwallader, on a bond 
prosecuted to the use of the said Joseph Taylor, assignee of the said Lambert Cadwallader, by 
virtue of certain acts of the legislature authorizing persons whose estates have been confis-
cated to prosecute and recover the same; provided, that the said Joseph Taylor, his executors, 
administrators or assigns, produce a certificate to the treasurer of this state, that he or they 
have exonerated and discharged the said Joseph Reading from the payment of the one third 
part of the said judgment." 
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plated by the 1795 act. 40 
These differences in form were significant. The earlier act had 
been directed to judges and required them to modify their earlier 
verdict; the later act was directed to Taylor and permitted him to 
exonerate Reading of liabilities to him. The earlier law was largely 
retrospective in effect; the later law provided for prospective relief. 
The later act, unlike the earlier one, did not fundamentally chal-
lenge judicial prerogatives. 
Vindicating Parkhurst's account of Taylor does not, of course, 
establish Holmes's precedence for judicial review. But lifting the 
cloud over Parkhurst clears the way for reconsidering Holmes. 
B. POWERS OF LEGISLATURES, JUDGES AND THE PEOPLE 
The issue in Holmes was whether the defendants were entitled 
to a twelve-person jury. Pursuant to a 1778 statute passed by the 
New Jersey legislature to prevent commercial intercourse with 
Great Britain,4t one Elisha Walton had seized goods in the posses-
sion of John Holmes and Solomon Ketcham having a value pur-
portedly exceeding £29,000. A proviso to section 6 of the act stated: 
PROVIDED ALWAYS, That it shall and may be lawful for either of the Parties to 
the Trial to demand a Jury; and upon such Demand the said Justice is hereby re-
quired to grant the same, and to proceed in all other Respects as in the like Case in 
the Act, intitled, • An Act to erect and establish Courts in the several Counties in this 
Colony for the Tn'al of small Causes, and to repeal the former Act for that Purpose, 
passed the eleventh Day of February, One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-
five, is directed; and on the Verdict of the Jury being taken, shall give Judgment 
agreeably thereto.42 
The "small causes" act governed trials of cases involving small 
claims. Among other things, it established procedures for trials by 
six jurors. 43 In accordance with these procedures, Holmes and 
Ketcham were tried under the seizure law by a jury of six persons. 44 
40. Compare Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. at 444 (stating that the New Jersey legislature "acqui-
esced" to the court's decisions in Holmes and Taylor). 
41. "An ACT to prevent the Subjects of this State from going into, or coming out of, 
the Enemy's Lines, without Permissions or Passports, and for other Purposes therein men-
tioned," October 8, 1778, reprinted in WILSON's LAWS, supra note 16, app. V. at 8. Briefly, 
the statute, one in a series of "seizure laws," permitted anyone who suspected that another 
person was carrying goods into or from the British lines to seize the goods and bring them 
before a justice of the peace. The person or persons who seized the goods would be entitled to 
any amounts recovered, minus court costs. 
42. /d. at 10-11. 
43. See "An ACT to erect and establish Courts in this Colony for the Trial of small 
Causes, and to repeal the former Act for that Purpose," February 11, 1795, reprinted inS. 
ALLINSON, ACTS OF THE GENERAL AssEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-JERSEY 468, 470 
(1776) (covering laws enacted between 1702 and 1776). 
44. See N.J. Archives, Envelope Nos. 18354 & 44928. 
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According to Parkhurst, the New Jersey Supreme Court invali-
dated the seizure law's provision for trial by six jurors.4s Such a 
decision would presuppose that the magistrate had complied with 
the seizure law in trying Holmes and Ketcham with six jurors. This 
presupposition also underlies Scott's claim that the court "met the 
question of constitutionality squarely."46 Crosskey argued, how-
ever, that the magistrate had not complied with the seizure law. In 
his view, the seizure law required "a Jury" of twelve persons, pur-
portedly incorporating the New Jersey Constitution's requirement 
in this respect.47 
According to Crosskey, rather than using the New Jersey Con-
stitution to strike down the seizure law, the court used it as a basis 
for construing that statute.4s He essentially interpreted the seizure 
law as providing that all trials would be "by jury as required by 
article XXII of the constitution," while interpreting that article to 
require twelve jurors in cases such as Holmes.49 Crosskey's argu-
ments therefore converged with Scott's in viewing constitutional 
norms as determinative of the case's outcome. so 
45. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. at 444. 
46. Scott, supra note I, at 460. See also id. at 468-69. I refer in this section to Scott's 
arguments as representing arguments that the court exercised judicial review in Holmes along 
the lines reported in Parkhurst. Compare Corwin, supra note I, at 110-12. 
47. See W. CROSSKEY, supra note I, at 949-51. Compare L. BoUDIN, supra note I, at 
543-46. 
48. W. CROSSKEY, supra note I, at 948-51. Crosskey's distinction between statutory 
construction and constitutional review is fraught with peril. He utilized twentieth century 
theoretical distinctions and relied upon twentieth century norms of constitutional adjudica-
tion in analyzing a case decided when all agree judicial review on constitutional grounds was 
not a common practice. His arguments along these lines were seemingly anachronistic if not 
biased. 
49. On the latter issue, Crosskey referred to "antecedent practice in New Jersey, when 
the constitution of 1776 was adopted." See id at 949. 
50. Boudin's argument roughly paralleled Crosskey's. Briefly, he assumed that "the 
constitutional provision for trial by jury meant trial by a jury of twelve." Furthermore, he 
recognized that the attorney for Holmes and Ketcham addressed constitutional issues in his 
petition of additional reasons: "Counsel for Holmes and Ketcham were, insofar as this par-
ticular question of the jury of six is concerned, making the point, first and principally, that 
under the law of October 8, 1778, they were entitled to a trial by a jury of twelve men; and 
then, that even if the law of October 8, 1778, does not specifically provide for it, the Constitu-
tion does." Boudin drew an artificial distinction between the seizure law's constitutionality 
and actions pursuant to it: "[T]here is no reference to any unconstitutionality of any law, but 
merely that the jury before which the defendants were actually tried was not in accordance 
with the Constitution." As these quotations indicate, Boudin's argument also depended on 
interpreting the constitutional guarantee of "trial by jury" as requiring twelve jurors in 
Holmes, but he did not examine the basis for such an interpretation other than to quote the 
petition's reference to "practices and laws of the land." See L. BoUDIN, supra note I, at 546-
48. 
Compare Leonard Levy's remark: "The constitutionality of the act was not at issue, and 
the court gave no opinion, not even in obiter dicta, on whether it had the power to void an act 
for unconstitutionality." L. LEVY, supra note I, at 93. In the absence of an opinion, the 
absence of obiter dicta is only logical. 
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It seems odd that Crosskey went to such lengths to avoid view-
ing Holmes as an example of judicial review.st Although generally 
opposed to judicial review, Crosskey did concede that courts can 
properly disregard legislation interfering with "judicial preroga-
tives."52 He therefore implied that courts have ultimate interpretive 
authority with respect to constitutional provisions concerning judi-
cial powers and processes.s3 If Crosskey had not been so commit-
ted to a theory of determinate constitutional meanings,s4 it is 
doubtful he would have expended such great effort to avoid con-
cluding that the New Jersey court opposed the legislature by enforc-
ing "judicial prerogatives" in Holmes.ss 
51. By locating the entire ambiguity at the level of statutory rather than constitutional 
meanings, Crosskey avoided issues of interpretive authority. Thus, he glossed over whether 
the court had authority to interpret the constitution independently of the legislature-either 
to resolve ambiguity or to invalidate the law. But if the seizure law had unambiguously 
permitted trial by six jurors in cases such as Holmes, Crosskey would have been forced to 
confront directly the possibility of confticting constitutional interpretations. If the judges 
interpreted the constitution as requiring twelve jurors, would it have mattered whether par-
ticular legislators interpreted the constitution as requiring only six jurors? Would the judges 
have been constrained by their knowledge or ignorance of whether or how legislators had 
interpreted the constitution? If the court had ultimate interpretive authority for purposes of 
resolving the particular case, what would have been the effect (if any) of its decision on the 
authority of executive officers with respect to the law's enforcement in future cases? Would 
the court's interpretation of the constitution have bound legislators in making future laws? 
What if the legislature re-enacted a law previously declared void by the court? Would re-
enactment preclude judges from adhering to their earlier views of unconstitutionality? 
For an argument that judges are bound to give eft'ect to unconstitutional acts of a coordi-
nate legislature as long as they are "passed according to the forms established by the constitu-
tion," see Judge Gibson's dissent in Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant & Rawle (Sup. Ct. of Pa., 
1825), reprinted in W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 221. 
52. See W. CROSSKEY, supra note I, at 974, 1002-07. 
53. Or perhaps courts have penultimate authority concerning judicial prerogatives, with 
the people retaining ultimate authority. Compare U.S. CoNST., preamble & amend. X. 
54. See Wollan, Crosskey's Once and Future Constitution, 5 THE POL. Sci. REVIEWER 
129 (1975). 
55. Boudin also expended great effort to avoid a conclusion contrary to his theory of 
legislative supremacy. Unlike Crosskey, however, he confronted at least obliquely the issue 
of whether Holmes set a precedent regarding the constitutionality of trials by six jurors. The 
evidence Boudin cited, however, does not support his conclusion that the legislature acted 
"quite irrespective of any decisions by courts, or imaginary constitutional questions" in 
amending the seizure law first to allow and then to require trial by twelve jurors. See L. 
BoUDIN, supra note 1, at 548-SO. To the contrary, the pattern oflegislation and adjudication 
following the court's decision in Holmes indicates a remarkable degree of consistency and 
cooperation between the legislature and the courts. See Scott, supra note 1, at 461-63 and the 
series of laws reprinted in the appendix to WILSON'S LAws. The evidence Boudin cited re-
garding legislation and adjudication permitting trials by six jurors in "small causes" (not 
cases arising under the revised seizure statutes) did not support his claim that Holmes was not 
decided on constitutional grounds or was disregarded. Holmes certainly was not a "small 
cause," and hence the materials Boudin cited were not on point. 
A fact that is particularly damaging to Crosskey and Boudin's arguments is that the 
New Jersey legislature continued to direct the magistrate "to proceed in other respects" as 
provided in the small causes act, even after it amended the seizure law to require twelve 
jurors following the supreme court's decision in Holmes. See "An ACT more eft'ectually to 
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As Crosskey recognized, determining the scope of trial by jury 
is a paradigmatic judicial prerogative.s6 Attempts by the legislature 
to circumscribe this judicial power would have seriously threatened 
judicial independence, among other things challenging the judges' 
authority to interpret the extent of their own judicial powers. s1 The 
judges in Holmes therefore resisted a challenge to their authority 
different in kind but similar in principle to that later presented in 
Taylor.ss 
In addition to threatening judicial independence, the seizure 
law threatened one of the people's most fundamental rights. Within 
the American colonies, the people's representation within legisla-
tures and their participation on juries were conceived as "the heart 
and lungs" of popular govemment.s9 Through these institutions, 
the people shared in making and enforcing laws. 60 The issues of 
interpretive authority in Holmes were integrally related to preroga-
tives that the judges would have been especially concerned to pro-
tect from legislative encroachment.6I 
II 
Although related in practice, the question of what norms the 
judges were enforcing in Holmes is conceptually distinct from the 
question of whose interpretation of these norms prevailed.62 On the 
former issue, Holmes is clear precedent for courts' enforcing funda-
mental norms in addition to those explicit in New Jersey's constitu-
prevent the Inhabitants of this State from Trading with the Enemy, or going within their 
Lines, and for other Purposes therein mentioned," December 22, 1780, reprinted in WILSON's 
LAWS, supra note 16, app. VIII, at 16, 18. 
56. See W. CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 1002-07. 
57. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also, L. LEVY, see 
supra note 1, at 99. 
58. The challenge in Holmes was both conceptually and chronologically prior to that in 
Taylor. 
59. See J. Adams, Letter from The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym (Jan. 20, 1766), 
quoted in C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN 
TRADmON OF POLmCAL LIBERTY 388-89 (1953). 
60. See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 120-41 (1765), reprinted in 5 P. 
KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CoNSITfUTION 388-94 (1987); 2 S. ADAMS, THE 
RIGHTS OF THE CoLONISTS (1772), reprinted in P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra, at 394-
97. See also B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967); H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 18-19 (1981); C. ROSSITER, 
supra note 59, at 362-401; G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787 (1969). 
61. Compare Walter Murphy's argument for a "departmental" view of interpretive au-
thority in Murphy, supra note 4. Note that the judges in Holmes were strategically situated 
to resist an encroachment by the legislature upon the right of trial by jury: They could refuse 
to enforce laws infringing that right. 
62. See generally W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, supra note 4. 
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tional text, whether in conjunction with interpreting statutes or 
invalidating them. 
A. ENUMERATED RIGHTS AND UNWRI'ITEN LAW 
The petition filed by the attorney for Holmes and Ketcham 
listed eight grounds for reversal. The seventh claimed that by the 
"Laws of the Land" the jury should have consisted of twelve rather 
than six jurors.63 The attorney's statement of "additional reasons" 
elaborated on this claim, stating that the jury "of six men only" had 
been "contrary to Law," "contrary to the constitution of New 
Jersey" and "contrary to the Constitution, practices and Laws of 
the Land."64 
Although we cannot be certain why the attorney drew these 
distinctions or what they meant to the justices of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, we may reasonably interpret "the Law" as a refer-
ence to common law and statutory law; "the constitution of New 
Jersey" as a reference to New Jersey's written constitution; and "the 
Constitution, practices and Laws of the Land" as a reference to fun-
damental norms including but not limited to those made explicit in 
the constitutional text.6s Reversal of the verdict in Walton's favor 
63. The petition stated that "the Judgment given ... ought to be reversed and annulled 
for the following reasons ... 7. Because the Jury sworn and who tryed the above cause, and 
on whose Verdict Judgment was entered, consisted of six men only when by the Laws of the 
Land, it should have consisted of twelve men." Boudin and Crosskey emphasized the sixth 
reason included in the bill of exceptions: "6. Because the said Elisha Walton did at his own 
expense, and without the Consent of the said John and Solomon treat with strong Liquor the 
jury sworn to try this cause after they were impannelled and appeared, and before they gave 
their verdict in the said cause." Boudin argued that the placement of this (sixth) reason 
before the constitutional challenge indicated that the latter was relatively unimportant. See 
L. BoUDIN, supra note l, at 546-47. Compare W. CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 949. Consider, 
however, the final (eighth) reason: "8. For that the said Justice gave Judgment for the said 
Elisha against the said John and Solomon, when according to the Laws and CUStoms of the 
State of New Jersey, he should have given Judgment for the said John and Solomon against 
the said Elisha." Apparently the reasons were arranged in order of increasing generality, 
rather than decreasing importance. See N.J. Archives, Envelope No. 18354. 
64. N.J. Archives, Envelope No. 18354. Note the difference in capitalization, which 
suggests a difference between New Jersey's "constitution" and its "Constitution." Further-
more, compare the eighth reason given for reversal included in the initial petition, quoted at 
note 63, supra. which indicates that there was a significant amount of continuity between the 
initial and subsequent petitions. Compare also MAGNA CARTA, Ch. 39 (1215), reprinted in 
B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 8, 12 ("No freeman shall be captured or imprisoned or dis-
seised or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go against him or send 
against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."); U.S. 
CONST., art. VI, para. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."). 
65. See generally Grey, supra note 8; Sherry, supra note 7. I use the term "we" in 
describing these positions to emphasize that the interpretive premises of contemporary inter-
preters shape their organization of historical materials in ways that do not perfectly corre-
spond to contemporaneous understandings. The distinctions that Grey and Sherry have 
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required interpretation of these three overlapping sets of norms. 
Article XXII of the New Jersey Constitution, the same article 
that guaranteed "the inestimable right of trial by jury," also stated 
that: 
The common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been 
heretofore practiced in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be 
altered by a future law of the Legislature; such parts only excepted, as are repug-
nant to the rights and privileges contained in this Charter. 
The constitutional text therefore established a tri-partite hierarchy 
(in order of increasing priority): (1) common law and prior statu-
tory law, (2) subsequent statutory law, and (3) the constitutional 
"Charter." Thus, although the common law and prior statutes re-
quired twelve jurors in cases such as Holmes,66 article XXII treated 
the authority of the common law and earlier statutes as subordinate 
to subsequent legislation. The judges could not rely on the common 
law to invalidate a trial by six jurors, but had to rely on the consti-
tutional text or other (unwritten) norms of higher authority than 
ordinary legislation. 
Confounding searchers after determinacy, New Jersey's consti-
tutional text, like that of the later federal Constitution,67 was silent 
on the question of how many jurors would satisfy its most funda-
mental guarantee.6s Thus the first documented case of a court's en-
drawn (which I largely follow) were apparently blurred in the late-eighteenth century, as 
indicated by the initial petition's not distinguishing the requirements of "Laws of the Land." 
66. See generally the works cited at note 60, supra. See also the West Jersey "Conces-
sions and Agreements" of 1676, which proclaimed that the following guarantee, among 
others, was "not to be altered by the Legislative authority": "THAT the tryals of all causes, 
civil and criminal, shall be heard and decided by the virdict or judgment of twelve honest 
men of the neighbourhood." See A. LEAMING & J. SPICER, GRANTS AND CoNCESSIONS 382, 
393, 398 (Articles XIII and XXII) (2nd ed. 1881). See also Articles XVII and XIX of the 
"Concessions and Agreements," which also referred to trials by twelve jurors (Spicer, at 395, 
396-97); and Articles VI of the Act of November 21, 1681, West Jersey (Spicer, at 426,428-
29). In addition, a formal declaration of "Rights and Priviledges" passed by the House of 
Representatives in East Jersey on March 13, 1698 stated: "All tryals shall be by the verdict 
of twelve men." (Spicer, at 368, 372.) See also Article XIII of the Act of March 1682, East 
Jersey. (Spicer, at 227, 235). Compare Scott, supra note 1, at 459 (referring to these docu-
ments as "a part of the 'law of the land.' "). 
67. See U.S. CoNST., art. III, sec. 2 & amends. VI-VII. 
68. Article XXII of New Jersey's constitutional text of 1776 reads in part: "The inesti-
mable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without 
repeal, forever." To ensure the perpetuity of this guarantee, article XXIII required members 
of the state legislature to take an oath not to take any action annulling or repealing the part of 
article XXII respecting trial by jury. Articles XXII and XXIII together suggested both that 
the constitution's framers regarded trial by jury as the constitution's most fundament guaran-
tee and that they relied primarily upon the legislature for its preservation. Compare Corwin's 
comment: "It is interesting to note as evidence that the idea of judicial review had not oc-
curred to those who drafted the New Jersey Constitution three years before [argument in 
Holmes], the fact that they relied for the preservation of this,-as they evidently esteemed 
it-most fundamental provision of the constitution upon the good faith of the legisla-
354 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:341 
forcing an American colony's written constitution centered on an 
issue not addressed explicitly in the text of that constitution.69 
The court could have affirmed the verdict in Walton's favor, 
but could not have reversed it, based on a literal application of arti-
cle XXII. There had been a "trial by jury." Because the constitu-
tional text did not specify how many jurors were required, the court 
quite plausibly could have affirmed the verdict on textual grounds. 
In contrast, the judges had to rely on norms extrinsic to the consti-
tutional text in deciding that the number of jurors was inadequate. 
The judges might have relied on extrinsic norms (1) by interpreting 
the constitutional text as incorporating them, or (2) by conceiving 
of such norms as having authority independent of the constitutional 
text. 
Scott alluded to the possibility that article XXII incorporated 
prior charters, statutes, or customary norms.7o He was not clear, 
however, on whether the various documents to which he referred 
were relevant only to interpreting the constitutional text or whether 
they had independent authority as judicially enforceable law. The 
petition by Holmes and Ketcham's attorney advocated the former 
view by claiming that the verdict was contrary to "the constitution 
of New Jersey." The petition implicitly claimed, in other words, 
that the reference in the constitutional text of 1776 to "trial by 
jury" meant "trial by twelve jurors," at least in the context of 
Holmes. 
Holmes offers insights on some of the advantages as well as 
difficulties associated with enumerating and interpreting constitu-
tional rights. Enumerating the right of "trial by jury" in New 
Jersey's constitutional text reinforced arguments that some form of 
jury trials had fundamental constitutional status. But as Madison 
warned in relation to the federal Constitution, "there is great reason 
to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most essential 
ture .... " See Corwin, supra note l, at 111. Another possibility comes to mind: placing 
primary responsibility for compliance upon the legislature was not inconsistent with assum-
ing that courts had a secondary/supplemental/corrective role. 
69. In light of Boudin and Crosskey's arguments, which are discussed above, I am not 
here assuming that the court interpreted the Constitution separately from the seizure law. 
The judges had to confront in some manner the issues discussed in the text in order to resolve 
the case. As indicated above, however, how the judges interpreted the Constitution is con-
ceptually independent from whether they interpreted the seizure law as consistent with the 
Constitution. 
70. He stated: "The assumption that the phrase 'trial by jury' as thus used [in Article 
XXII] meant exactly twelve jurors must find its warrant farther [sic] back." Scott, supra note 
1, at 458-59. Compare the constitutional text's treatment of such sources as otherwise 
subordinate to recent statutory law. See note 66, supra, and accompanying text. 
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rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude."7t He was 
concerned that the "public definition" of rights would be "narrowed 
much more than they are ever likely to be by an assumed power. "72 
Enumerated rights might be interpreted literally in a narrow man-
ner and as implying the legitimacy of exercising power except to the 
extent specifically prohibited. 73 In the case of the New Jersey Con-
stitution, article XXII might be interpreted literally as requiring 
only some type of "trial by jury" and as implying that the legisla-
ture had authority to regulate judicial proceedings except as specifi-
cally prohibited. 74 
Holmes supports a richer interpretive approach. The judges re-
lied on extrinsic norms whose authority the constitutional text af-
firmed rather than circumscribed. The constitution did not 
contemplate narrowing the right of trial by jury, but rather pro-
vided additional security for it. Legislators were required to give an 
oath not to take any action annulling or repealing that right, and its 
enumeration in the constitutional charter provided a textual peg 
upon which judges could rely in exercising judicial review.1s Com-
pliance with this oath by legislators, or judicial enforcement of its 
requirements in the event of legislative non-compliance, would re-
quire more than literalism. Legislators and judges were obliged to 
interpret enumerated rights with reference to fundamental norms 
transcending the constitutional text itself. 
Relationships among political culture, constitutional text and 
governmental institutions were mutually reinforcing. Reflecting 
widespread political priorities of the time, the right of "trial by 
jury" was the only right explicitly "confirmed as a part of the law of 
this Colony, without repeal, forever." Enumerating this right, in 
71. See Letter from J. Madison to T. Jefferson (October 17, 1788), reprinted in B. 
ScHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 614-15. 
72. See id. at 615-16. 
73. Compare Wilson's and Hamilton's arguments against enumerating rights in the 
case of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., article I, section 9 (categorical prohibitions); 
article I, section 10 (prohibitions on the states); article III, section 2 (requires the trial of 
crimes by jury, except in cases of impeachment). But see article IV, section 2 (protects "privi-
leges and immunities," primarily against state action. See also the preamble (the Constitution 
is ordained and established to "secure the Blessings of Liberty."). Compare the first amend-
ment (prohibitions on Congress.) 
74. Compare Corwin's argument that "from the standpoint of present day constitu-
tional law the assembly, rather than [the court in Holmes], was right in its construction of the 
constitution." See Corwin, supra note I, at 111. 
75. As Madison explained, again in the federal context, "independent tribunals of jus-
tice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of [enumerated] rights." See 
J. Madison, "Speech to the House of Representatives," June 8, 1789, reported at 1 ANNALS 
OF CoNGRESS 424, 439 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834). See also note 77, infra, and accompany-
ing text. Furthermore, as discussed in the text below, issues of federalism complicated the 
role of courts' enforcing rights. 
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tum, fostered its recognition and affirmation as a "fundamental 
maxim[] of free Government, "76 thereby creating and preserving 
social meanings binding on the legislature through their solemn 
oath not to repeal or annul the constitutional guarantee. In addi-
tion, naming the right in the constitutional text provided a "legal 
check" upon which courts could rely in exercising judicial review. 11 
Legislative compliance with this right, as well as its judicial enforce-
ment, would involve the people in governmental processes. The 
people's participation in trials, as well as legislators and judges' re-
affirming the people's fundamental prerogative to do so, would fur-
ther promote the incorporation of "fundamental maxims of free 
Government" into political culture. 1s 
B. WRITIEN LAW AND UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 
The attorney's argument that Holmes and Ketcham's trial had 
been "contrary to the Constitution, practices and Laws of the 
Land" also invoked traditions of unwritten fundamental law, ac-
cording to which certain rights were judicially enforceable whether 
or not enumerated in a constitutional text or any other particular 
document. 79 It is apparent that the court would have invalidated 
the seizure statute's provision for six jurors even if the constitu-
tional text had not enumerated the right to "trial by jury." Scott 
was correct in referring to various documents as "constituting ... a 
part of the 'law of the land.' "so It is important to recognize, how-
ever, that the right of trial by twelve jurors had fundamental consti-
tutional status in New Jersey independent of colonial charters, acts 
of assembly, or even the constitutional text. This right was legally 
authoritative because it was regarded as fundamental; it was not a 
fundamental right merely because it was affirmed in the constitu-
tional text.s' 
76. Compare Madison's argument in the context of debates over the desirability of 
amending the constitutional text of 1787 to enumerate particular rights: "The political truths 
declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of 
free Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract 
the impulses of interest and passion." Letter from J. Madison toT. Jefferson (October 17, 
1788), reprinted in B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 614, 616-17. 
77. See Letter from T. Jefferson to J. Madison (March 15, 1789), reprinted in B. 
ScHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 620. 
78. See note 76, supra. 
79. See generally Grey, supra note 8; Sherry, supra note 7. 
80. See Scott, supra note l, at 458-59. 
81. Compare Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional lAw, 12 MICH. L. 
REV. 24 7-48 (1914) ("private rights, since they precede the constitution, gain nothing of au-
thoritativeness from being enumerated in it, though possibly something of security. These 
rights are not, in other words, fundamental because they find mention in the written instru-
ment; they find mention there because they are fundamental.") 
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The ninth amendment to the federal Constitution made explicit 
this theoretical premise that rights do not depend for their authority 
on being enumerated in a constitutional text. That amendment 
states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people." The constitutional text of 1787 and its first eight amend-
ments enumerate various rights,s2 but according to the ninth 
amendment these documents do not contain an exhaustive listing of 
the people's rights: The people retained others which shall not be 
denied or disparaged.sJ Unlike the federal Constitution, New 
Jersey's Constitution did not explicitly afford constitutional status 
to unenumerated rights. But this omission did not imply that only 
those rights enumerated in the state's charter were legally 
authoritative. 84 
The ninth amendment's reference to unenumerated rights is 
analogous to the New Jersey constitution's enumeration ofthe right 
of "trial by jury" without specifying its context. Neither text was 
an exhaustive listing of the governing norms. Neither text entirely 
supplanted extra-textual sources of law. Both texts were designed 
to reinforce rather than circumscribe rights whose authority tran-
scended the text itself. 
Holmes is a particularly valuable precedent because it was de-
cided shortly before the federal Constitution's adoption complicated 
efforts to ascertain the basis for decisions invalidating state laws. 
Taylor highlights these complications under the federal system. 
Although the United States Constitution included a prohibition on 
ex post facto laws, it is not clear whether the judges relied on that 
prohibition in Taylor.ss As in Holmes, they may have relied on un-
written norms having higher authority than ordinary legislation. 
Justice Chase's claim in Calder v. Bull that a prohibition on ex post 
82. The constitutional text of 1787 does not use the terminology of "rights" to describe 
prohibitions on government or prerogatives of the people. Instead it uses the discourse of 
"powers" and prohibitions. 
83. Compare the ninth amendment's usage of the term "shall" with, for example, the 
first amendment's usage of the same term. Note also that whereas the first amendment states 
what Congress shall not do in making laws, the ninth amendment contains no exclusions in 
terms of the persons to whom it applies or the types of activities it constrains. 
84. Compare the status of rights enumerated in the federal Constitution until the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights in 1791. Compare also the legality of ex post facto laws within New 
Jersey prior to the New Jersey Constitution's amendment in 1844 to enumerate that right. 
85. Charles Erdman, Jr., and William Crosskey both assumed that the judges in Taylor 
relied on the federal Constitution. See C. ERDMAN, THE NEW JERSEY CoNSTITUTION OF 
1776 96, n.36 (1929); I W. CROSSKEY, supra note I, at 340-41. Both, however, noted that the 
New Jersey court's decision in Taylor was broader than the United States Supreme Court's 
decision interpreting the federal ex post facto clause in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 
(1798) (holding that the clause applied only to criminal proceedings). 
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facto laws was "a fundamental principle [which] flows from the 
very nature of our free republican government"s6 was an equally 
plausible argument at the state level, independent of the federal 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
We need to take a fresh look at the texts that constitute our 
fundamental law. The framers of state constitutions and of the fed-
eral Constitution were aware of the limitations of language,s1 yet 
they were captivated by the possibilities that written texts provided. 
They attempted to secure the people's rights by carefully delegating 
governmental powers and in some cases by enumerating the peo-
ple's rights. Recognizing imperfections in their works, the framers 
of the federal Constitution also granted unspecified powers, re-
served others, and prohibited interpreting enumerated rights as an 
exhaustive listing of the people's prerogatives. 
Open-ended provisions such as the federal Constitution's nec-
essary and proper clause, its due process and privileges and immu-
nities clauses,ss and the ninth and tenth amendments present 
interpretive issues that are greater in magnitude but similar in kind 
to those presented by more determinate parts of the constitutional 
text. In each instance, the constitutional text alone does not pro-
vide an exhaustive statement of the governing norms. In each in-
stance, the constitutional text therefore needs to be interpreted with 
reference to norms extrinsic to the text. In each instance, the Con-
stitution as "law" requires interpreting a particular provision in re-
lation to other parts of the Constitution.s9 Both to interpret and to 
identify rights and powers, extrinsic norms are important parts of 
America's fundamentallaw.90 
86. 3 U.S. at 388. 
87. See, e.g., James Madison's statement in the THE FEDERALIST No. 37 at 229 (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961) that "no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every 
complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas." 
Compare James Wilson's statement to the Pennsylvania Convention on October 28, 1787: 
"In all societies, there are many powers and rights which cannot be particularly enumer- \ 
ated." 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNVENTIONS ON THE ADoPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION 436 (J. Elliot ed. 1861). 
88. See U.S. CoNST., art. IV, sec 2 (privileges and immunities); amend. V (due process); 
amend. XIV (privileges or immunities, due process). 
89. Compare C. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CoNSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1969). 
90. In Holmes, the judges relied on connections between constitutional provisions and 
extrinsic norms: The constitutional text supported the court's holding that Holmes and 
Ketcham were entitled to a trial by twelve jurors. Similar connections exist in the case of the 
United States Constitution's more open-ended provisions. The Constitution's enumeration of 
some rights and the manner of its enumerating powers support the enforcement of unenumer-
ated rights and powers. For example, the first amendment's enumeration of rights of speech 
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The viability of judicial review in reliance on these extra-tex-
tual sources of law depends on the establishment and maintenance 
of constitutional meanings within a broader interpretive commu-
nity. Two hundred years ago, constitutional meanings were devel-
oping which would support an expansion of judicial power. We 
need to reconsider which of these meanings remain a part of 
America's fundamental law and how they relate to others that have 
subsequently developed. 
and assembly supports by analogy the enforcement of an unenumerated right to associate. 
Similarly, relationships between enumerated rights and delegated powers suggest that some 
unenumerated rights represent absences of delegated power and others limit the manner of 
exercising powers that were delegated. Relationships between powers delegated to the United 
States government and those reserved to the states provide conceptual categories for analyz-
ing relationships between governmental powers and powers reserved to the people. Similari-
ties and di1ferences between references to unenumerated rights and references to 
unenumerated powers provide further criteria for interpreting unenumerated rights and pow-
ers and their respective relationships to other parts of the Constitution. 
